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1II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.  Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to reconsider the summary
dismissal of Max Gorringe’s petition for post-conviction relief.  R 381-384, 390-393. 
The question before this Court is whether the district court erred in failing to decide
the IRCP 60(b) aspects of  Mr. Gorringe’s pro se motion which was entitled “Motion
to Reconsider (set aside) Dismissal of Postconviction (5-20-15); Rule 59(e), 60(b) or
any other rule that may Grant Relief and or in the alternative Motion to Review the
record.”  Mr. Gorringe submits that the district court erred and that the order of
denial should be vacated and the matter remanded for proper consideration. 
B.  Procedural History and Statement of Facts
On November 1, 2011, Mr. Gorringe entered a guilty plea pursuant to a
written binding plea agreement to a single count of attempted strangulation.  R
189-190.  Mr. Gorringe filed an appeal.  R 190.  The Court of Appeals denied relief,
the Supreme Court denied a petition for review, and the Court entered a remittitur. 
Id.   Thereafter, Mr. Gorringe filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  Id. 
The district court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition.  R 190-
195.  The amended petition raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
based upon a conflict of interest, based upon deficient performance in advising Mr.
Gorringe to enter a guilty plea because he had a winning appeal issue when in fact
the issue had already been abandoned, and based upon counsel’s failure to correct
factual errors in the PSI which the district court then relied upon in sentencing Mr.
2Gorringe.  Id. 
The district court summarily dismissed the amended petition on May 19,
2015.  R 245-258.  That same day, the court entered its final judgment.  R 261-262.
On June 2, 2015, Mr. Gorringe signed and had notarized his pro se “Motion to
Reconsider (set aside) Dismissal of Postconviction (5-20-15); Rule 59(e), 60(b) or any
other rule that may Grant Relief and or in the alternative motion to review the
record” was filed.  R 265. Although the pleading was signed and notarized on June
2, 2015, it was not filed in the court record until June 5, 2015.  R 265. 
On July 14, 2015, the district court denied the pro se motion.  R 381-384.  The
court first denied the motion because it was untimely given the lack of evidence
that it was placed in the prison mail no later than June 2, 2015.  R 382.  The court
also held that even if the motion had been timely, it would be denied because the
motion does not identify legal or factual errors in the dismissal of the petition, but
rather attempts to raise new claims (mental health status and ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel) and identifies discovery that would be needed to
establish the new/additional claims not raised in the petition.  The court concluded:
A motion filed pursuant to I.R.P.C. 59(e) is not the vehicle to raise
additional claims or present new evidence, but instead is designed to
identify factual or legal errors made by the Court; Petitioner has failed
to identify any such errors.  
R 382.
Although the court also appointed counsel (prior counsel having withdrawn)
to provide assistance in establishing that the pro se motion to reconsider was placed
3in the prison mail system so as to make the motion timely under IRCP 59(e), no
evidence of timeliness was ever entered into the record.  R 385-387. 
Thereafter, the district court entered its final judgment.  R 388-389.  And,
Mr. Gorringe filed a timely notice of appeal as to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration.  R 390-393.
III.  ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the district court err in considering Mr. Gorringe’s motion filed under
both IRCP 59(e) and 60(b) as only a Rule 59(e) motion and thus failing to decide
Rule 60(b) matters?  
IV.  ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred in Not Deciding the Rule 60(b) Aspects of Mr.
Gorringe’s Motion
Mr. Gorringe filed his motion under both IRCP 59(e) and 60(b).  However, the
district court addressed the motion as only an IRCP 59(e) motion and therefore
found it untimely and also found that the attempt to raise new claims was
foreclosed because Rule 59(e) is not an appropriate vehicle to raise new claims.  The
court did not address any Rule 60(b) aspects of the motion.  In failing to address the
Rule 60(b) aspects of the motion, the district court erred. 
A motion to alter or amend a judgment under IRCP 59(e) allows the court to
correct errors of fact and law that occurred in the proceedings and thus circumvent
an appeal.  Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 706, 979 P.2d 104, 108
(1999); First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 603, 570 P.2d 276, 281 (1977). 
4The rule requires that the motion be made no later than 14 days after the entry of
the judgment. IRCP 59(e). 
By contrast, IRCP 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for several reasons including any reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.  IRCP 60(b)(6).  Review is not limited to
mistakes of fact and law.  Further, Rule 60(b) motions may be made more than 14
days after the entry of the judgment.  Depending upon the basis for the motion, the
motion must be filed within six months or within a reasonable time of the entry of
the judgment.  IRCP 60(b). 
Mr. Gorringe’s motion was made under both IRCP 59(e) and 60(b).  R 265-
353.  And, as the district court noted in deciding the IRCP 59(e) portion of the
motion, the bulk of the motion argued reasons for relief which were not cognizable
under IRCP 59(e) as they were not based upon mistakes of fact or law in the
judgment dismissing the petition.  Rather, they were “attempts to raise new claims
(his mental health status and ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel) . . .” 
R 382.  These new claims, while not cognizable under IRCP 59(e) may be considered
under  IRCP 60(b)(6) which allows relief for “any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.”  See Hopkins v. Troutner, 134 Idaho 445, 447, 4 P.3d
557, 559 (2000) noting that IRCP 60(b) “gives wide latitude to the trial court in
determining those circumstances under which to relieve a party from the effects of
an order.”  In Hopkins, a Rule 60(b) motion was properly granted where the district
court determined a lawyer had given legal advice to an unrepresented party in
5settling a claim, thereby coming into conflict with a comment to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, even though the comment had not been adopted in Idaho.  Id.
In Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 234 P.3d 699 (2010), the
Supreme Court noted that Rule 60(b) relief may be available where a district court
grants relief that is inconsistent with the pleadings and evidence in the case.  In
Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 274 P.3d 589 (2011), the Supreme Court upheld
relief under Rule 60(b) where the attorney representing Maynard failed to disclose
the purport of the correspondence directed toward the judge at a default hearing
when no default had been entered into the record.  Likewise here, claims of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel which led to an improper dismissal
of the petition fall within the ambit of Rule 60(b).  Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 737,
228 P.3d 998, 1004 (2010), holding that ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-
conviction proceeding which is the exclusive means for challenging the validity of a
conviction or sentence other than by direct appeal may present the “unique and
compelling circumstances” in which IRCP 60(b)(6) relief may be warranted.  
A district court’s failure to rule on a Rule 60(b) motion is error.  Dawson v.
Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho at 380, 234 P.3d at 704, citing Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7, 205 P.3d 650, 655-67 (2009) (holding that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to rule on the admissibility of certain evidence
prior to granting summary judgment); and Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall &
Co. of California, 163 Cal.App.3d 1126, 210 Cal.Rptr. 114, 115 (1985) (holding that
6“a trial court’s failure to issue a [ruling] when there has been a timely request
therefor is per se reversible error.”)  
In Dawson, the Supreme Court held that the district court’s failure to rule on
Dawson’s Rule 60(b) motion was error, even if the failure to rule could have been
interpreted as a denial of the motion, writing: 
The district court’s failure to rule on the motion leaves this Court
without an adequate basis upon which to understand the premise
behind the district court’s determination, and thus the district court
abused its discretion by failing to issue a ruling on Dawson’s Rule
60(b) motion. 
149 Idaho at 380, 234 P.3d at 704. 
Based upon this error, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the district
court to rule upon the motion.   Id., 149 Idaho at 377, 234 P.3d at 701. 
Likewise in this case, this Court should remand to the district court for a
ruling on the Rule 60(b) elements of Mr. Gorringe’s motion.  This is especially so
because as in Eby, supra, and Dawson, supra, the district court may find the unique
and compelling circumstances sufficient to justify relief under IRCP 60(b)(6).  Mr.
Gorringe’s claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may amount to
circumstances which would allow relief.  Ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel no longer is sufficient reason for filing a successive petition. Murphy v.
State, 156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 P.3d 365, 371 (2014).  Yet, at the same time, post-
conviction is most often the first and only remedy for an unconstitutional
deprivation of effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598,
7603-04, 329 P.3d 380, 385-86 (Ct.App. 2014).  Thus, the only remedy for a petitioner
who has not sufficiently raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
initial petition because of the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a
Rule 60(b) motion and claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
may present reason for relief under the rule.  Eby, supra.  In this case, this Court
should remand with directions to the district court to decide the Rule 60(b) part of
Mr. Gorringe’s motion.  
V.  CONCLUSION
The district court erred in not ruling on the Rule 60(b) part of  Mr. Gorringe’s
motion.  He asks that this Court grant relief by remanding the case for a decision by
the district court. 
Respectfully submitted this 10  day of March, 2016. th
/s/_________________________________
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Max Gorringe  
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